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TORTS-PLAINTIFF'S VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCE AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff was injured while alighting from a taxicab in Rich-
mond. The defendant taxicab company set up plaintiff's viola-
tion of a municipal ordinance as a defense. The ordinance pro-
vides in part:
No passenger shall enter or leave any taxicab by way of
the left rear door or side thereof except on one way streets
when such vehicle is stopped on the left side of said street
for the purpose of taking on or discharging a passenger and
on publicly owned parking lots; nor shall any driver know-
ingly or willfully permit any passenger to enter or leave a
taxicab by such door except as otherwise herein provided. 1
The cab, with the plaintiff as a passenger, was traveling in a
northward direction on Randolph Street. As the street is nar-
row, twenty feet from curb to curb, parking is permitted only on
the east side, and there were two cars parked on that side of the
street opposite plaintiffs home. Although there was sufficient
parking space ahead, the driver stopped alongside of and about
fourteen inches from one of the parked cars. The plaintiff paid
her fare to the driver who then devoted his attention to writing.
Seeing she could not leave by the right door, the plaintiff did not
protest to the driver but attempted to leave by the left rear door.
She could not open this door and so informed the driver who
reached around and opened the door for her. The plaintiff did
not leave her seat but caught hold of the inside of the door
frame with her left hand. Before she could alight, an automobile
traveling in a southward direction struck the cab's door, knock-
it closed on her hand. In the trial court the plaintiff recovered a
verdict against the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed. Plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
National Cab Co. v. Bagby, 196 Va. 703, 85 S.E.2d 270 (1955).
(Two Justices were absent, and Buchanan and Smith, JJ., dis-
sented.) On rehearing, held, affirmed. 196 Va. 1027, 85 S.E.2d
274 (1955) (Spratley, Buchanan and Smith, JJ., dissenting).
I National Cab Co. v. Bagby, 196 Va. 703, 705, 85 S.E. 2d 270, 272 (1955).
There is much diversity among the states as to the weight to
be given to the violation of a statute or ordinance in determining
whether or not the violator has exercised due care. Some courts
hold that such a violation is negligence per se,2 others hold it
is prima facie evidence of negligence, 3 while still another group
considers it as only evidence of negligence. 4 A number of juris-
dictions have denied the same significance to violation of an
ordinance that they give to violation of a statute.5 The Supreme
Court of Arkansas expressed the reasoning used by the courts
making this distinction by saying:
It is not within any of the general or special powers con-
ferred upon municipal corporations in this state to create a
right of action between third persons, nor to enlarge the
common law or statutory liability of citizens among them-
selves.6
Courts following the majority view have found no reason for hold-
ing the violation of a statute negligence per se and not giving like
effect to the violation of a municipal ordinance.7 This majority
view seems preferable, for to allow the jury to determine the
weight to be given to the violation of an ordinance would be to
place their will above that of the lawmakers.8
In Virginia, violation of a statute is negligence per se.9
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeals follows the majority
view as it has repeatedly held that the violation of a municipal
ordinance is negligence per se.10
When it is the plaintiff who violates a statute or ordinance
intended for his own protection and such violation is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained, it is the general rule that
2Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353 82 S.E.2d 331 (1954); Bissell v. Seattle Vancouver
Motor Freight, Ltd., 25 Wash.2d 68, 168 P.2d 390 (1946); Prosser, Torts 274
(1941).
oNey v. Yellow Cab Co., 348 Ill.App. 161, 108 N.E.2d 508 (1952); Rich v. Rosen-
shine, 131 W.Va. 30, 45 S.E.2d 499 (1947).
'Wainwright v. Jackson, 291 Mass. 100, 195 N.E. 896 (1935).
s Rotter v. Detroit United Ry., 205 Mich. 212, 171 N.W. 514 (1919); Temple v. Walker,
127 Ark. 279, 192 S.W. 200 (1917); Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N.Y.
488 (1881).
eBain v. Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. 116 Ark. 125 ...... 172 S.W. 843, 845(1915).7 James v. Carolina Coach Co., 207 N.C. 742, 178 S.E. 607 (1935); Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. Meyer, 150 Va. 656, 143 S.E. 478 (1928); Stevens v. Luther, 105 Neb. 184, 180
N.W. 87 (1920); Restatement, Torts §285 (1934).
8 14 Va.L.Rev. 591 (1928).
OVa. Code §8-652 (1950); Crist v. Fitzgerald, 189 Va. 109, 52 S.E.2d 145 (1949);
Lavenstein v. Maile, 146 Va. 789, 132 S.E. 844 (1926).
10 Moore v. Virginia Transit Co 188 Va. 493, 50 S.E.2d 268 (1948); Atlantic Coast
Line Co. v.NIyler, 124 Va. 4A4, 98 S.E. 641 (1919). See 14 Va.L.Rev. 591 (1928).
he is guilty of contributory negligence." In Basset & Co. v.
Woods' 2 the Virginia Court stated:
There is really no distinction between negligence in the
plaintiff and negligence in the defendant and where their
negligence concur to produce the injury there can be no re-
covery. 13
Those statutes that are passed for the protection of members of
a class who are considered incapable of protecting themselves
constitute one exception to the general rule that violation of a
statute or ordinance by plaintiff as well as by defendant is negli-
gence. The child labor laws are a notable example. "It is uni-
versally held that the employment in violation of the statute is
in itself negligence and the proximate cause of the injury inde-
pendent of the circumstances under which the injury occurred."14
As a general rule, even violation of the law by the child through
misrepresentation of his age is not a bar to recovery.' 5
Inasmuch as none of the exceptions to the general rule ap-
ply in the instant case, it is submitted that the decision of the
Court in finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law was correct. Although the taxicab driver was
highly culpable, and the aggregate of his actions manifested his
lack of consideration and care for his passenger, she was not re-
lieved of the standard of care required of her by the ordinance.
The minority judges' contention that plaintiff did not violate
the ordinance because she did not leave her seat and only placed
her hand in the inside of the door does not appear tenable. The
plaintiff's actions in leaving the taxicab had gone beyond pre-
paration, and the purpose of the ordinance was to prevent such
an accident as did occur.
Any criticism of the result should be directed at the framers
of the ordinance. This ordinance has placed the taxicab com-
panies in a better position than drivers of other vehicles and such
11Lanier v. Johnson, 190 Va 1 55 S.E.2d 442 1949); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. V.
Roberts, 130 Va. 532 107 9.E. 838 (1921); Restatement, Torts §469 (1934).1: 146 Va. 654, 132 S.E. 700 (1926).
15 Id. at 664, 132 S.E. 700, 703 (1926).
1 Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Washington Brick Co., 148 Va. 829, 838, 139
S.E. 513t 516 (1927). Cf. Restatement Torts §483 (1934).
15 Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Washington Brick Co., supra note 14.
a result is highly inconsistent with the Virginia rule that common
carriers owe their passengers the highest degree of practical
care,16 whereas other compensated drivers owe their passengers
only ordinary care,17 and a host must be grossly negligent before
he is liable to his guest.18 The taxicab companies have been re-
lieved of almost all responsibility for their negligence when a
passenger leaves by the left door and are only discouraged from
allowing such unsafe practices by a remote possibility of a small
fine for violation of a city ordinance not easily capable of strict
enforcement.
An ordinance which would place responsibility for passen-
gers using the left doors on the taxicab driver, leaving the
reasonable, prudent man test for the passenger, would be prefer-
able. The driver is in a better position than the passenger to
know laws which he is concerned with every day, and such an
ordinance would tend to promote safety among the cab com-
panies.
Cecil W. Johnson
Ie Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Shelton 184 Va. 684, 36 S.E.2d 625 (1946).
17 Dickerson v. Miller, 196 Va. 659, 8 5 S.E.2d 275 (1955).IsVa. Code §8-646.1 (1950); Mountjoy v. Burton, 185 Va. 936, 40 S.E.2d 803 (1947).
